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ABSTRACT
The 2020 general election turned out more American voters than any other election, its monumen-
tal stakes commanding the attention of the world. While the focus in the race’s aftermath has pri-
marily been the top of the ticket, the rebuke of President Trump’s time in office, the equally important 
down-ballot races have been largely passed over. Many major political analysts like the Cook Political 
Report predicted that Democrats would expand their House majority by 5-10 seats. Yet, the Democratic 
Party ended up losing 10 seats1. During the certification of election results, I collected data on incum-
bents in the US House of Representatives in their re-election bids. The paper examines performance 
of 2020 incumbents relative to 2018, and the factors which caused change in vote share. Findings sug-
gest that the GOP had an even more successful down-ballot campaign than reported and highlights 
the absence of certain systemic factors once assumed to weigh heavily on incumbency advantage.
Sounding the Alarm: 




Incumbency has long served to be not only one of the largest advan-
tages in politics, but also a main reason for continuous and growing 
discontent in our politicians. Yet, despite years of complaining of 
Congress’ inability to accomplish anything worthwhile, Americans 
again and again go to the ballot boxes and elect the same represen-
tatives and senators. Without term-limits, the bicameral legislature 
of the United States is built on experience, and depending on geo-
graphic location, an election win can guarantee you a lifetime of 
public service in Washington. Take Rep. Don Young (R-AK) who 
is the longest serving member of the House of Representatives, 
winning a special election of the seat of Rep. Dan Begich, who 
tragically died in a plane crash in 1973. Young started his 25th term 
in 2021, the longest serving member in the history of the Republi-
can party. Yet Don Young is able to serve so long because Alaska 
has a long history of voting Republican, Alaskans not voting for a 
Democratic presidential candidate since Lyndon Johnson in 1964.
Yet geography has never been the chief factor in deciding the fate 
of an incumbent representative and their ability to hold their post 
for a long period of time; demographics have long factored into 
not only the ability of one to get elected, but the strength of their 
incumbency advantage. Despite comprising of over 50% of the pop-
ulation, women, in a record-setting year held just 103 out of 435 
seats in the House of Representatives, a scant 23% of the legislative 
body. The Senate is hardly more representative with only 26 of its 
100 members being female in its 116th legislative session, also a 
record. Around the world, just 18% of politicians are women2. But 
1   Wasserman, Dave. House Republicans Defy the Polls, Narrow the Demorats’ 
Majority. Cook Political Report. November 4, 2020. https://cookpolitical.com/
analysis/house/house-overview/house-republicans-defy-polls-narrow-democrats-ma-
jority 
2  Shair-Rosenfeld, Sarah and Hinjosa, Magda. Does Female Incumbency 
do the difficulties of being elected persist for women after they have 
already won a seat? In other words, is the incumbency advantage as 
strong for women as it is for men? At first glance, out of 15 seats lost 
by the Democrats in the House of Representatives in 2020, a dispro-
portionate number of them (6) were lost by women. Furthermore, 
depending on the election cycle, the party of the candidate plays 
a key role in the strength of their incumbency advantage. In years 
where the sitting president is a Republican, Democrats often gain a 
boost in the upper chambers (Senate and the House) and vice-versa. 
For instance, the Democrats gained a whopping 41 seats in their bid 
to re-take the House of Representatives in 2018, seen as a response 
to President Trump’s policy. No matter the cycle, a candidate’s party 
is a strong indicator of their electoral showing at the polls.
METHOD
I. Data Collection
To collect the data for the data set, I visited the secretary of state’s 
websites in all 50 states to extract total votes cast and vote share 
of the incumbents running for re-election in 2020. I compounded 
these data with data of the same variables compiled by the Federal 
Election Committee (FEC) from the 2018 elections leading to the 
seating of the 116th House of Representatives. However, the data 
in the dataset excluded a few current representatives per their elec-
tion via special election. Special elections take place at a separate 
time from the general or midterm elections in November with the 
purpose of filling a vacant seat. Vacancies were not considered in 
the dataset as their high-profile nature funnels in millions of dollars 
more in donations than if it were during the normal cycle. Vacan-
Reduce Gender Bias in Elections? Evidence from Chile. Political Research 
Quarterly. 2014. University of Utah Press
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cies occur for many reasons such as the death of a member of Con-
gress such as the late Rep. John Lewis (D-GA) or an appointment to 
a cabinet position as seen in the case of former White House Chief 
of Staff, Rep. Mark Meadows (R-NC).
II. Variables and Methodological Choices
In collecting the data from the 435 incumbent members of the House 
of Representatives, due to the nature of the individual races and the 
freshness of the data, I had to make choices about which data to 
include in the final data set, and those to exclude. Below, I will be 
doing an in-depth explanation of the main variables in the data set.
Change in Vote Share: The dependent variable in this dataset is 
extracted from examining the change in vote share from 2018 to 
2020. In measuring the strength of incumbency advantage, it is 
not sufficient to merely look at which candidates retained their 
seats and which ones lost them. In a normal cycle, 20-25 seats will 
change hands out of 435 making the data very insufficient. Thus, in 
order to accurately quantify the incumbency advantage in 2020, I 
looked at the incumbent’s vote share as a relative statistic, relative 
to past performance in 2018. Looking at the dependent variable 
as relative to past performance, though, is pertinent. A Democratic 
candidate gaining 52% of the vote in a very Democratic California 
district is nowhere near comparable to a Democrat gaining 52% of 
the vote in ruby red Oklahoma. Of course, however, the composi-
tion of the races may change drastically from cycle to cycle. Val 
Demings (D-FL), a 2-term congresswoman from Orlando, was not 
even challenged by a major party candidate in 2018, gaining 100% 
of the vote. Fast forwarding two years, Val Demings only received 
63.60% of the vote, challenged in the general election by a Repub-
lican. Comparing these two elections’ vote shares is not an accurate 
representation of incumbency advantage. For any candidate who 
ran unopposed in either 2018 or 2020, I did not calculate the change 
in their vote share. Furthermore, I did not calculate the vote share 
of any candidate whose opponent was drastically different from one 
year to the next. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) ran 
against a Republican in 20183  winning 86.8% of the vote in her 
very Democratic district. Republicans, knowing the race would be 
lost, did not challenge Pelosi in 2020, opening the way for a Dem-
ocratic opponent who, as a much more viable alternative to the 17-
term congresswoman, cut Pelosi’s vote share to 77.6%. Due to the 
discrepancy in the composition of these two elections, Pelosi’s, and 
others in her situation over two election cycles. Finally, I also was 
not able to include data from representatives who were not seeking 
re-election or had died. In calculating this statistic, I used two-par-
ty vote share, getting rid of the third-party candidates (unless they 
had a significant presence in the race) to more accurately compare 
data from the two cycles. The data was collected from December 
14-17 of 2020 from Secretaries of State, and the exclusion crite-
ria was considered qualitatively, not through automation. When in 
doubt, the data was excluded from the dataset as to not skew the 
data. Election data from New York will pour in until June of 2020, 
likely, but the votes are unlikely to drastically change vote share. 
3 California’s electoral system sends the top two performing candidates from the 
primary (held in the spring) no matter the party preference of the candidates. Thus, 
in some districts, especially the very partisan solid blue districts near Los Angeles, 
candidates from the same party will face off in the general election.
Candidate Gender: The independent variable is of interest to see 
its effects on the vote share from one election cycle to the other. In 
this study, 0 represented Male representatives and 1 represented 
Female representatives.
Challenger Gender: This variable seeks to answer the question 
whether the gender of the candidate challenging the incumbent has a 
significant impact on how their change in vote share. In this study, 0 
represented Male challengers and 1 represented Female challengers.
Race Competitiveness: Per Cook Political Report’s rankings on 
house races published on November 2, 2020, 73 races were catego-
rized as “Likely”, “Lean” or “Toss-up”. I combined all these races 
into a single categorization- “Competitive”. These ratings indicate 
that there is at least a chance of these 73 seats being competitive 
and changing hands. In theory, the vote share of an incumbent may 
actually increase if their race is rated as being more competitive as 
the national party leadership (DNC, RNC) will pour more money 
into the race in hopes of winning. In the study, 0 represented Safe 
seats and 1 represented Competitive seats in the 2020 cycle. 
Terms Served: This variable is included to investigate whether be-
ing a member of congress for a longer period of time produces con-
tinuous and compounding incumbency benefits. In the dataset, half-
terms produced from a special election are counted as a full term as 
in theory, the special election should grant the representative all the 
effects of normal incumbency advantages: name recognition from 
being on the ballot in the past, work experience (no matter how 
long), and media coverage as an incumbent. While the variable is 
continuous, as will be explained later, I grouped the terms together 
into three levels under the rationale that after a set number of terms, 
it is almost impossible for an incumbent to be unseated.
DATA ANALYTICS STRATEGY
Before fitting a model for the data, I proceeded to plot distributions 
of the variables of my data set, checking for normalcy and making 
changes to the variables accordingly. In examining the distribu-
tion of terms served in congress, I decided to create a variable of 
Binned Terms which grouped together all those who had served 1 
term at the time of the 2020 election (1), those who had served 2-5 
terms (2) and those who had served more than 5 terms (3). 
Figure 1. Frequency Distribution (Terms Served). Source: US Library of 
Congress
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After plotting the distributions of my independent and dependent 
variables (see Appendix A), I moved towards fitting two models. 
First, I fit a model of my main affects using my principle indepen-
dent variables to predict the change in vote share (see Table 1). Af-
ter doing so I moved to calculating the two-way ANOVA between 
select pairs of my independent variables (see Appendix B) to check 
for the significance of their interactions. I used two-way ANOVA 
after checking the conditions to run the ANOVA test. Finally, I fit a 
model using both the main affects and the interactions of indepen-
dent variables. The interaction model, as will be explained later, 
hardly made a difference in predicting the dependent variable. 
RESULTS
Both the main effect model and the interaction model’s R-squared 
values’ indicated their ability to predict the change in vote share 
from 2018 to 2020 about 50% of the time using only five variables 
(and their interactions). While the interaction model was slightly 
more encompassing than the main effects model, the difference is 
quite negligible between the two.
The means shown in Table 2 were calculated using the sample size 
(N=344) and subsequently split by group depending on the inde-
pendent variable. One such variable where the mean is drastical-
ly different is the party of the candidate. The party and challenger 
gender variables are statistically significant to the highest degree 
and the terms variable’s p-value falls below the α = 0.05 threshold 
making it also statistically significant.
The frequency distribution is quite shocking and is the first indication 
of the disastrous 2020 down-ballot results for the Democratic party. 
The mean change in vote share between the parties is extremely dis-
tant, with the Republicans gaining on net and the Democrats losing 
vote share on average. The histogram of Democratic incumbents is 
quite normal, yet centered around -2%, an almost even distribution 
of vote share. While the distribution is relatively normal, they see a 
large boost near 0, a sign that many districts voted Republicans in at 
the same rate they had in the past election cycle.
At first glance, the gender distribution (see Figure 3) looks equally 
discrepant, almost as much as the party distribution, and yet the 
p-value is not even close to being statistically significant (0.709). 
Not only do female incumbents perform much worse than their 
male counterparts no matter which gender is challenging them, but 
they seem to lose more when being challenged by a male than a fe-
male challenger, pointing towards institutional sexism in electoral 
politics. Even though women heavily outraise men due to strong 
campaign donation sites such as Emily’s List, when parties “act as 
gatekeepers, endorsing and supporting candidates”, female candi-
dates are undermined and in turn underrepresented at both a local 
and federal level4.  Men perform marginally better against a female 
challenger than a male challenger. However, in the discussion, I 
will touch on why this may be slightly misleading.
DISCUSSION
In examining the model, the main contributor is clear: party. And 
as far as this election cycle was concerned, being part of the Dem-
ocratic party did not do you any good. With an effect size of 0.427 
(Table 2), a candidate’s party affiliation was largely responsible for 
the change in vote share that would occur from 2018 to 2020. How-
ever, the significance of party changes bears both good news and 
bad news for the Democratic party moving forward. As shown in 
4 Sanbonmatsu, K. (2010). Where Women Run Gender and Party in the American 
States. University of Michigan Press.
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Figure 2, the average Democrat took a heavy hit relative to their 
2018 numbers, however, it should’ve been expected had this been a 
normal year. While the presence incumbent Republican President, 
a largely unpopular one at that, should lead to Democrat victories in 
down-ballot races, it is important to put the race in context. Turnout 
in the election was sky high, through the roof… for the presiden-
cy. House races on the other hand, not so much. Furthermore, it is 
important to take into account that Republicans have the unique 
advantage of defending much safer seats. On average, Republicans 
are defending R+13 seats (x̄ = 13.19) vs. the Democrats who on 
average defend D+11 seats (x̄ = 11.08). The standard deviation tells 
an even greater story as one standard deviation in Republican-held 
seats is 6.54 points compared to 11.83 points for Democrat-held 
seats. Thus, whether it be because of the tendency towards the sta-
tus quo, a deeply polarized electorate, or the absence of a quali-
fied challenger due to safer seats that are almost guaranteed wins, 
hardly any Republicans lost ground in this election from their 2018 
numbers (Figure 2). Ultimately, no matter how safe the district was 
for the Democrats, they lost ground, shown by the large effect size 
of the party independent variable in the change in vote share, an 
all-around rebuke of the Democratic party. G.K. Butterfield (D- 
NC) experienced the biggest overall drop, losing 15.47% from his 
2018 total of 69.85%. The second biggest drop was the outspoken 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), perhaps the most well-known 
representative in the House and the face of the young Democrat-
ic-Socialist wing of the party, losing 12.79% from her 2018 totals. 
Yet, the good news for the Democratic party is that the effects of 
the model are not permanent nor perfect. While the model encapsu-
lates almost half of the values using just five main effect variables 
(0.4704) from 2018-2020, it does not take into account previous 
elections and will certainly not work until 2024. Districts are be-
ing re-drawn after this election cycle meaning that the variable for 
change in vote share will not be accurate until two election cycles 
with the new districts have passed (2024). 
Much of previous literature on historic incumbency advantage 
has supported the notion that men are much more likely to have a 
stronger incumbency advantage than women. In a study of 6-year 
and 12-year incumbency periods, Gary Moncrief and Joel Thomp-
son find that while the cohort of women have a higher 12-year 
retention (50.0%) than do men (27.8%), the retention is almost 
negligible considering the discrepancy of women and men in the 
legislative branch.5 At least in the findings of my data, I would 
say that the discrepancy is significant. While the average man per-
formed 0.74% better (see Table 2) than he did in 2018, the average 
woman performed 1.56% worse! However, while significant and 
enough to change an election, it is hard to determine that this is 
because the candidates are women. The effect size of candidate 
gender was essentially 0 (0.004) on the model and the association 
between a candidate’s gender and party contributed to under 1% 
of the model (0.006). 
I would liken the discrepancy in means, yet the lack of statistical 
significance, to two factors. First, representation of women is so 
low in congress that there is a lack of data to pull from. In future 
investigations, I would love to pull from contribution data and 
PAC donations to determine whether women receive less money 
and less attention from the leadership. This lack of data effects the 
results just as the Moncrief and Thompson findings from 1993. 
While the findings themselves are significant, the sample size is not 
large enough. Until there are more women, it is hard to determine 
whether incumbency disadvantage is due to gender simply from 
vote share data: reversely causal but true.  Secondly though, the 
party affiliation of women in the house of representatives is crucial. 
The large majority of women in the house are Democrats meaning 
that we cannot definitively determine whether the loss of vote share 
was based on gender or party allegiance. Herbert Weisberg of Ohio 
State University writes, “The incumbency effect would be expected 
to be greatest for pure independents, who are not affected by par-
tisan ties to either major party.”6 That being said, first-term female 
congresswomen Donna Shalala (D-FL), Debbie Muscarel-Pow-
ell (D-FL) and Kendra Horn (D-OK), who lost their first bids for 
re-election by 1.4, 1.6 and 2.04 points respectively, would likely 
look to a mix in increased partisanship and gender for their loss-
5 Thompson, J.A., Moncrief, G.F., 1993. The implications of term limits for 
women and minorities: some evidence from the states. Social Science Quarterly 
74 (2), 300–309.
6 Weisberg, H.F, 2002. Partisanship and Incumbency in Presidential Elections. 
Political Behavior (Special Issue: Parties and Partisanship Part 3) 24 (4), 339–360.
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Candidate Gender, Party, Race Competitiveness, Binned Terms, Chal-
lenger Gender
Significance codes:  0 ‘***’   0.001’**’  0.01’*’     0.05 ‘.’   0.1 ‘ ‘  1
                                                Table 3. Associations of Variables
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es. However, since Weisberg’s analysis, analysis of DW-Nominate 
scores has confirmed that congressional partisanship has increased 
exponentially over the last sixty years (Andris, Lee, Hamilton, 
Martino, Gunning, Selden 2015). However, while Weisberg finds 
that pure independency leads to a stronger incumbency advantage, 
Americans are electing more and more partisan candidates with 
high DW-Nominate scores leading to even less cooperation and the 
near elimination of re-election based on bipartisanship and moder-
atism.7 Thus, it is clear to see why party affiliation had the largest 
effect size in the model (0.427) as the American political system 
moves towards pure partisanship.
Two variables which I expected to yield more conclusive results 
were the challenger gender and race competitiveness variables. 
While the gender of the challenger predicted 4.6% of the model, 
its finding that incumbents do better on average against men is a bit 
misleading considering that the majority of nominated challengers, 
and challengers who win primaries, are men, a continuation of the 
fact that gender bias exists both in the chambers and at the local 
level in party nomination and in primaries. Furthermore, race com-
petitiveness was pretty much a non-factor as was the number of 
terms that someone has served. Race competition is an interesting 
case, as competitive swing seats will likely yield stronger challeng-
ers from the challenging opposition in order to flip it, or at least as a 
money guzzling technique. Yet, in the grand scheme of things, there 
is no strong correlation between how competitive the seat is and 
the effect on vote share. When examining election by election, it is 
likely to see that turnout may have skyrocketed and lead the incum-
bent to a much larger win than the year before. However, on the flip 
side, the same may is surely to occur for an incumbent running in a 
safe seat, stretching their margin without a viable challenger. Race 
competitiveness is clearly important in donations, turnout, overall 
attention paid by the party establishment and an interesting case 
study in the partisanship of candidates, but it doesn’t have any siz-
able effect on vote share. 
In a future experiment, I plan to run a regression using the terms 
served as a continuous variable rather than a binned one (Figure 4- 
see Appendix A). The problem with running a regression though, 
is that the distribution (Figure 1) looks like Poisson’s model, not 
even close to normal.
CONCLUSION
While on the surface, Democrats may focus on Joe Biden’s 7 mil-
lion vote win over President Trump, they have much to worry about 
after a nationwide rebuke of their party’s effectiveness in Congress. 
While not irreversible, Democrats need to be prepared for the fight 
of their lives to keep the House in 2022 after redistricting.
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